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Abstract 
This paper examines differences in bank efficiency between banks affiliated with single-bank 
holding companies and those affiliated with multi-bank holding companies by applying a fuzzy 
multi-objective two-stage data envelopment analysis technique. Using a sample of U.S. 
commercial banks covering 1994–2018, the results show that banks affiliated with multi-bank 
holding companies are more efficient than those affiliated with single-bank holding companies, 
suggesting that the former takes advantage of their parents’ resources to enhance their 
efficiency, consistent with the internal capital market theory. They also show that banks with 
a powerful CEO exhibit lower efficiency than others. Moreover, there is an inverted U shape 
relationship between multi-bank holding company structure and bank efficiency, suggesting 
the presence of an optimal number of multi-bank holding subsidiaries that maximizes 
efficiency. 
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Bank inefficiency is considered as one of the main reasons behind the financial crisis 
that has shaken the U.S. banking system during 2007–2009 (Assaf et al., 2019). Since the Bank 
Holding Companies Act of 1956, bank holding company (BHC hereafter) structures have 
become dominant in the US banking industry (Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al., 2012). They 
controlled over 15 trillion USD in total assets, accounting for more than 95% of total US 
banking assets in 2015. Kane (1996) emphasizes that the holding company framework can re-
engineer the organisations to squeeze a large product line and geographically dispersed 
network. The rapid increase in the number of BHC subsidiaries has raised concerns on whether 
BHC structures enhance the efficiency of banks at the subsidiary level (Kashian et al., 2019). 
On the one hand, Assaf et al. (2019) find that efficient banks are more resilient to financial 
crises than their inefficient peers. Specifically, banks with lower cost and revenue efficiency 
could suffer higher bank risk (Fiordelisi et al., 2011). On the other hand, Luo et al. (2011) and 
Barth et al. (2008) state that financial crises have harmed banking activities from the funding 
side and the lending side, significantly reducing bank efficiency. In fact, banks reduced their 
lending activities (De Haas and Van Horen, 2013), while at the same time suffering from 
pressure due to the risk of withdrawal of deposits from customers (Martinez Peria and 
Schmukler,  2001). While the difference in bank efficiency between diversified and focused 
bank structures is questionable1, it is essential for the regulators to increase bank efficiency at 
different bank holding company structures, leading to more stable U.S. banking industry.  
 
This paper applies Data envelopment analysis (DEA hereafter) to assess bank efficiency 
since this technique has been widely used as a tool to measure performance in the banking 
industry (Wang et al., 2014; Barth et al., 2013). The DEA approach is a commonly applied 
non-parametric method to compute efficiency scores. It is combined here with a second stage 
regression analysis to determine factors explaining the level of bank efficiency (Casu et al., 
2011; Curi et al., 2013). More specifically, we use a fuzzy multi-objective two-stage DEA 
approach to measure bank efficiency. This technique has been used by Wang et al. (2014) for 
bank holding company efficiency. Different from Wang et al. (2014), we focus on the 
subsidiary level of BHCs and compare the efficiency between banks belonging to a single-
BHC and those that belong to a multi-BHC.  
                                                          
1 A diversified bank structure is defined as a bank that owns two or more bank units while focused bank structure 
is a bank that has only one bank unit.  
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This study adopts the fuzzy approach developed by Zimmermann (1978) that 
transforms a multi-objective programming problem into a single-objective programming 
problem. We choose to apply fuzzy multi-objective DEA because this technique has several 
advantages compared to conventional DEA. First, a conventional DEA methodology considers 
the production procedure as a ‘black box’ with insufficient details to identify sources of 
inefficiency. Indeed, the bank production function is complex with the interaction of different 
activities and divisions (Zimmermann 1978). Second, conventional DEA gives a relatively 
large number of efficient DMUs, implying weak discriminating power. Fuzzy multi-objective 
DEA combines all the efficiency functions of each DMU into one function, providing more 
accurate result (Wang et al., 2014).  
 
By using commercial bank data from 1994 to 2018, this paper examines the difference 
in bank efficiency between a multi-BHC and a single-BHC at the subsidiary level2. On the one 
hand, multi-BHCs can strengthen their finance by diversifying their funding externally and 
creating internal capital funding (San-Jose et al., 2018). Multi-BHCs can also lessen financial 
difficulties and avoid bankruptcy for their affiliates by transmitting their source of finance to 
them. Moreover, one subsidiary within a multi-BHC can share resources with other 
subsidiaries. On the other hand, multi-bank holding’s affiliates have lower efficiency due to 
their structure (Makinen and Jones 2015). A multi-BHC has more than two subsidiaries; 
making it, therefore, relatively difficult for multi-BHCs to distribute their financial resources 
equally between their affiliates. In addition, there is a competition at the affiliation level that 
may lead to higher cost of raising capital and reduce bank efficiency. Using several estimation 
techniques, i.e., fixed effect, truncated regression, difference-in-difference regression based on 
propensity score matching and dynamic treatment, we show that multi-BHC affiliates exhibit 
higher efficiency scores than their single counterparts. This result is consistent with the internal 
capital market theory, suggesting that multi-BHC affiliates can receive resources both from 
their parents and other banks that belong to the same multi-BHC.  
 
There is also a possibility that affiliates of a multi-BHC suffer from high risk despite 
their benefit from the internal capital market. Hughes et al. (1996) state that diversification 
                                                          
2 We define banks at the subsidiary (or affiliate) level as banks that belong to BHCs. A single-BHC has one bank 
unit while a multi-BHC has two or more bank units. We interchangeably use affiliates, affiliated banks, and 
subsidiaries throughout our paper. More specifically, banks that belong to a single-BHC are called single-BHC 
affiliates whereas those belonging to a multi-BHC are considered as multi-BHC affiliates. 
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causes an increase in the proportion of loan to assets, which leads to higher credit risk. 
Berrospide et al. (2016) explain the risk transmission channel between BHC affiliates. More 
specifically, BHC affiliates could endure negative spillover effect through internal capital 
market when their peers suffer from local economic or credit shocks.  
 
There could also be a link between efficiency and bank concentration, bank size and 
bank structure (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 2000). For instance, in dynamic and expanding 
markets, banks may benefit from growing demand, increased activity in branch offices, and 
expanded networking that could improve efficiency and vice versa. However, dealing with 
more customers could generate inefficiencies because of the need to meet all of their diverse 
requirements. Gonzalez (2009) suggest that ignoring endogeneity leads to biased estimation 
given the endogeneity nature of bank structures. To solve a possible endogeneity issue, we 
apply a difference-in-difference method based on propensity score matching. We first match 
banks switching their status from single-BHC affiliates to multi-BHC affiliates with banks that 
hold the same status based on bank characteristics such as bank size and bank capital. We then 
estimate a difference-in-differences regression to consider whether and how banks affect their 
efficiency when they switch their status from single-BHC affiliates to multi-BHC affiliates. 
We find that single-BHC affiliates that switch to multi-BHC affiliates gain higher efficiency.   
 
We also test whether corporate governance, especially CEO power could influence the 
effect of bank structure on bank efficiency. Prior literature does not show clear-cut findings 
regarding the relationship between CEO power and bank efficiency, especially within different 
banking structures. Stulz (1988) and Bhagat and Jefferis (2002) suggest that bank governance 
plays an important role in explaining bank efficiency. On the one hand, powerful CEOs are 
likely to dominate boards, affect their decisions, and encourage the adoption of risky activities, 
leading to lower efficiency. On the other hand, powerful CEOs are more inclined to reduce 
conflicts between board members, hence increasing bank efficiency. We find that multi-BHC 
with powerful CEOs are less efficient. This result is consistent with prior research (Bitar et al., 
2018; Haque and Brown 2017) and provides practical implications for bank regulators, 
especially for bank activities within different BHC structures. 
 
Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it applies a fuzzy multi-
objective two-stage DEA technique that considers the structure of US banks. This technique is 
an advanced performance measurement tool that combines efficiency functions of all DMUs 
5 
 
into one function and increases discriminating power (Wang et al., 2014). Second, it relies on 
internal capital market theory to expand our knowledge regarding the efficiency of multi-BHC 
subsidiaries. Third, our paper contributes to the recently growing literature on the role of CEO 
power in the banking industry. Fourth, it expands the literature comparing the efficiency 
between multi- and single-BHC subsidiaries. Our evidence shows an inverted U-shape 
relationship between multi-BHC network and bank efficiency, suggesting the existence of an 
optimal number of subsidiaries in BHC structures to gain the highest efficiency levels.  
  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 lays out the theoretical 
framework and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the multi-objective two-stage 
DEA. Section 4 describes the data and regression models. Section 5 presents the analyses and 
explains the empirical results. Section 6 reports robustness checks. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses development 
2.1. BHC structures and bank efficiency 
 
A Multi-BHC structure is organised as a hierarchy structure in which a holding company’s 
parent is located at the top. The parent company controls a lead bank while other bank 
subsidiaries can work as full-service branches. Contrariwise, Watkins and West (1982) define 
a single-BHC as a structure that includes a single bank and a number of nonbank subsidiaries.  
 
Diversification at the parent level may increase the parent’s capacity to create an 
internal capital market and acquire better financing deals. The internal capital market theory 
suggests that the creation of an internal capital market, where the parents allocate their 
resources across different projects, could reduce the need and the cost of external financing. 
This theory explains many benefits for subsidiaries. For instance, Houston and James (1998) 
find that affiliated banks have lower cash flow sensitivity of loan growth than stand-alone 
banks, implying that banks belonging to a banking group are more likely to reduce the cost of 
raising funds externally. Cremers et al. (2010) and Kashian et al. (2019) state that headquarters 
of banking groups can provide their affiliations with intertemporal insurance when 
experiencing shortfalls in funding. In addition, multi-BHC affiliates can access to internal 
secondary loan market of their parents, hence, the subsidiaries holding less capital can originate 
loans and sell them to better-capitalized affiliates. Therefore, the subsidiaries can mitigate any 




Internal capital markets are regarded as a “source-of-strength” (Mirzaei and Moore 
2019; Chronopoulos et al., 2013). For instance, headquarters can divert resources from other 
affiliates to rescue troubled subsidiaries. The “too-big-to-fail” resolution demonstrates that 
counterparties of troubled corporations need to be protected to decrease the collateral damage 
that was caused by the bankruptcy of that firm (Evanoff and Ors, 2008; Kaufman, 2014). In 
addition, headquarters can reallocate resources or reduce earnings volatility, that lead to lower 
risk-taking at the affiliate level of more diversified bank groups (Ly et al., 2018). Overall, a 
multi-BHC has more subsidiaries than single-BHC and allows them to have more internal 
resources. From the above arguments we draw our first hypothesis. 
  
Hypothesis 1: Multi-BHC affiliates exhibit higher efficiency than single-BHC affiliates 
 
2.2. CEO power and bank efficiency  
CEOs are more powerful and play a more important role in the decision-making process of 
their banks when they also chair the board of directors and have longer tenure at their position. 
In general, researchers find that CEO power has a detrimental effect on bank performance and 
efficiency. For instance, De Haan and Vlahu (2016) find that CEO power has a negative impact 
on bank performance as it leads to CEO entrenchment, hence, preventing other board members 
accessing information flows, influencing board decisions and undermining monitoring function 
of independent directors (Mollah and Zaman 2015). Lewellyn and Muller‐Kahle (2012) shows 
that CEO power measured by CEO duality reduces banks’ efficiency partly due to excessive 
concentration of power in one person’s hands. 
 
More specifically, CEO duality is the situation in which CEO is also the chair of the 
board. CEO duality may have a detrimental effect on bank performance, board monitoring and 
its influence on board decisions (Lasfer, 2006). For example, a powerful CEO has the ability 
to influence the selection of board members with the appointment of non-executive directors 
who are unlikely to influence their decisions (Adams and Mehran, 2012; Chen et al., 2018; De 
Jonghe et al., 2012). Nevertheless, a powerful CEO can have a positive impact on bank 
performance and bank efficiency. In particular, a combined role of CEO and chairman may 
prevent the agency problem within banks by reducing the likelihood of conflict between CEO 
and board members, thereby, improving banks’ performance and banks’ efficiency (Stoeberl 
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and Sherony 1985). Moreover, CEO duality enhances banks’ leadership, hence, directing 
banks’ objective in a clear manner and enhancing bank stability (Anderson and Anthony 1986). 
 
Several studies on banks have already addressed the issues regarding the impact of CEO 
power on bank performance and bank efficiency. Pi and Timme (1993) show that banks with 
non-duality CEO are more cost efficient than those with CEO duality. Grove et al. (2011) show 
that CEO tenure is negatively associated with bank performance and loan quality. However, 
Simpson and Gleason (1999) argue that US banks experience lower probability of financial 
distress when CEO is also a chair of board of directors because of better strategic vision and 
leadership. Therefore, it can be argued that 
 
Hypothesis 2: CEO power affects bank efficiency at BHC subsidiary level. 
 
3. Fuzzy multi-objective two-stage DEA for BHC affiliations 
3.1. Fuzzy multi-objective two-stage DEA 
The DEA method is a widely used technique in measuring efficiency in the banking industry. 
The conventional DEA ignores the production process and considers it a “black box” as it 
totally ignores what happens inside. This paper adopts a relational two-stage DEA model along 
with a fuzzy multiple objective programming design to analyse the organizational structure and 
production process of commercial banks. We focus on technical efficiency measured by 
dividing the weighted sum of outputs by the weighted sum of inputs. We consider input 
oriented instead of output oriented since bank managers have greater influence over bank inputs 
rather than bank outputs (Fethi and Pasiouras 2010). 
 
We follow Wang et al. (2014) to construct the fuzzy multi-objective two-stage DEA. 
Model (1) evaluates the relative efficiency of n 𝐷𝑀𝑈𝑗(j = 1,2, … n), each with m inputs 𝑥𝑖𝑗(i =
1,2, . . , m), q intermediate product 𝑘𝑝𝑗(𝑝 = 1,2, . . , 𝑞) and s output 𝑦𝑟𝑗(𝑟 = 1,2, . . , 𝑠). If we 





























𝑖=1   











∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗   
𝑚
𝑖=1
≤ 1, 𝑗 = 1,2… , 𝑛 
𝑢𝑟 , 𝜂𝑝, 𝑣𝑖 ≥ 𝜖 > 0    𝑟 = 1, . . , 𝑠     𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑚    𝑝 = 1,… , 𝑞 
In model (1), 𝑧1 is the efficiency of 𝐷𝑀𝑈1while 𝑢𝑟 , 𝜂𝑝 and 𝑣𝑖 are the factor weights. 









































≤ 0 , 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 
𝑢𝑟 , 𝜂𝑝, 𝑣𝑖 ≥ 𝜖 > 0    𝑟 = 1, . . , 𝑠     𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑚    𝑝 = 1,… , 𝑞 
 
To solve this model, Zimmermann (1978) fuzzy approach has been adopted, which 
transforms a multiple objective program into a single objective program. With regard to its 
objective function, each DMU illustrates its level of achievement through means of the 
















𝑙             𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑗
𝑙 ≤ 𝑧𝑗 ≤ 𝑧𝑗
𝑢
 1  𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑗 ≥ 𝑧𝑗
𝑢
 (3) 
where 𝑧𝑗 is the efficiency of 𝐷𝑀𝑈𝑗, 𝑧𝑗
𝑙  and 𝑧𝑗
𝑢 illustrate the lower bound and upper bound of 
the objective function, respectively. The membership function of 𝑧𝑗 is denoted by ℎ𝑗(𝑧𝑗). 
Within this function, the highest value of ℎ𝑗(𝑧𝑗) equals 1 and the lowest value equals 0. We 
solve the model by maximizing the minimum of the membership function in Model (3), which 































≤ 0 , 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 
𝑢𝑟 , 𝜂𝑝, 𝑣𝑖 ≥ 𝜖 > 0    𝑟 = 1, . . , 𝑠     𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑚    𝑝 = 1,… , 𝑞 
 
(4) 
Since efficiency of 𝐷𝑀𝑈𝑗 ranges from 0 to 1, the membership function ℎ𝑗(𝑧𝑗) can be simplified 
as 𝑧𝑗. For computational convenience, the auxiliary variable 𝜓 is introduced as follows   
 𝜓 =   min
n
𝑧𝑗
            𝑗                 
 (5) 
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≥ 𝜓, 𝑗 = 1,2… , 𝑛 (6) 
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ℎ are the efficiency of first stage, second stage and the whole process, 
respectively. 
 
3.2. Production process 
As banks play an intermediate role in transforming deposits into lending and investments we 
follow the intermediate approach to construct input, output and intermediate products (Favero 
and Papi 1995). The production process includes two stages. For the first stage, the inputs are 
interest expense and non-interest expense (Harris et al., 2013). Deposits play an intermediate 
role between the first and second stage. Holod and Lewis (2011) state that deposits should be 
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considered as the intermediate product of the process as deposits play a dual role in bank 
production procedure. Outputs include loans, interest income and non-interest income (Harris 
et al., 2013). The outputs of the first stage are inputs for the second stage.  
 
4. Data and regression model 
4.1. Sample 
This study uses panel data of BHC affiliates for the period 1994–2018. Each bank subsidiary 
that belongs to a BHC is treated as a DMU. We exclude stand-alone banks, banks with foreign 
ownership and keep only banks belonging to holding companies. We also discard banks with 
missing values for the inputs or outputs needed to run DEA and those with no data available 
for at least half of the study period. After cleaning the data, we use the “Jackstrap” methodology 
to obtain a homogenous dataset (Chortareas et al., 2013) by applying bootstrap and calculating 
each DMU efficiency score relative to all other DMUs when a DMU is removed from the 
dataset. By doing so, outlier banks with data errors can be detected and removed from the 
dataset. The final sample consists of 3853 banks from 1994 to 2018. 
 
  We primarily obtain the input and output data from Call report and CEO data from 
Boardex and SNL Financial that is part of S&P Global Market Intelligence. We match Boardex 
data with financial data from Call Report. CEO details are from Boardex (e.g., CEO tenure and 
CEO duality). When CEO information is not available in Boardex, we look at it in Bloomberg 
and bank annual reports. 
 
4.2. Variables and regression model 
To evaluate the effect of bank type on bank efficiency, we estimate the following model 
 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑀𝐵𝐻𝐶 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 +∑𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(9) 
where the dependent variable is Bank efficiency of BHC affiliates measured by fuzzy multi-
objective two-stage DEA. MBHC affiliate is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when 
banks are multi-BHC affiliates; and 0 if they are single-BHC affiliates. Controls are control 





We use different control variables that affect bank efficiency such as Bank size, Bank 
capital, Bank non-performing loan, and Bank profit. Ly et al. (2017) find that the likelihood of 
BHC affiliates being acquired targets in mergers and acquisitions changes across various asset 
size, therefore, Bank size is measured as the natural logarithm of total asset and is included to 
capture the size effects of BHC affiliates. Benston (1965) and Miller and Noulas (1996) show 
that large banks can take advantage of economies of scale and are more efficient than others. 
Bank capital is measured as total bank capital divided by total assets. There are opposite views 
on the effect of Bank capital on bank performance and efficiency. On the one hand, by a study 
of 72 countries during the period 1999–2007, Barth et al. (2013) find that well-capitalized 
banks exhibit higher efficiency. On the other hand, bank capital can negatively affect bank 
performance and efficiency, encouraging banks to take excessive risks (Altunbas et al., 2007). 
Bank non-performing loan is measured as total bank non-performing loan divided by total 
assets. The importance of non-performing loans has been discussed by Berger and DeYoung 
(1997), who consider that non-performing loans have a detrimental effect on banks’ efficiency 
and stability because of asset quality deterioration. Karadima and Louri (2020) also argue that 
financial and debt crises in the euro area highlight the serious problem of non-performing loans 
faced by majority of banks. Bank profit is measured by net income divided by total assets. We 
expect bank profit ratio to have a positive impact on bank efficiency as highly profitable banks 
are preferred by clients, attracting more deposit and better customers (Miller and Noulas 1996). 
 
We apply ordinary least square, fixed effect and truncated regression approaches. The 
latter is common in estimating the factors affecting bank efficiency as efficiency lies between 
0 and 1. We also apply parametric bootstrapping to enhance the reliability of the results.  
 
5. Analysis and results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics of variables used in the DEA model for single-BHC 
affiliates, multi-BHC affiliates and the whole sample. We winsorize all continuous variables at 
the 1st and 99th percentile to minimize the effect of outliers.  
 
“Insert Table 1 about here” 
 
The descriptive statistics from Table 1 show that multi-BHC affiliates seem to operate 
more efficiently than single-BHC affiliates with an average efficiency score of 0.50 and 0.43, 
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respectively. Multi-BHCs tend to be larger, have higher capital ratio, higher profit ratio but 
lower deposit ratio.3  
 
5.2. The impact of bank structure on bank efficiency 
Table 2 reports the results of our main regression. We adjust standard errors for 
heteroscedasticity and cluster them at the bank level. Year dummies are included in all models 
to control for year-fixed effects.  
 
“Insert Table 2 about here” 
The coefficient of our main variable, MBHC affiliate, is positively and statistically 
significant at the 1% levels, implying that multi-BHC affiliates have higher efficiency than 
single-BHC affiliates. The results are consistent for OLS, fixed effect and truncated regression. 
According to internal capital market theory, headquarters of multi-BHC can diversify and 
obtain better finance, creating internal capital for banks at both parents and affiliate level. 
Multi-BHCs have more subsidiaries than single-BHCs and, therefore, allow affiliates to access 
more internal resources than their single-BHC counterparts. The subsidiaries, therefore, can 
take advantage of better financing with lower cost and reduce the effect of undesirable output 
by sharing risks between subsidiaries (Lamont 1997; Stein 1997).  
 
For control variables, we find that large banks perform better, which is consistent with 
Barth et al. (2013), suggesting that larger banks may get benefit from economies of scale. 
Demsetz and Strahan (1995) state that large banks can take advantage of diversification. 
Diversification effect mostly dominates the internalization effect in multi-BHC structure, 
therefore, the multi-BHC subsidiaries can gain more benefits from the diversified structure (Ly 
and Shimizu 2018). Bank capital has a positive impact on bank efficiency, which is consistent 
with Barth et al. (2013). Bank non-performing loan has a negative effect on bank efficiency, 
implying that non-performing loans have a detrimental effect on banks’ efficiency and stability 
because of asset quality deterioration (Berger and DeYoung 1997). Bank profit exhibits a 
positive relationship with bank efficiency, indicating that profitable banks have higher 
efficiency. High profitable banks are preferred by clients, attracting more deposit and best 
potential borrowers (Miller and Noulas 1996). 
                                                          
3 Correlation matrix and VIF are available from the authors upon a request. They suggest the absence of 




5.3. Difference-in-differences based on propensity score matching analysis 
From the previous analysis, multi-BHC affiliates are found to be more efficient than their 
single-BHC counterparts. It can be argued that the difference in bank efficiency may not be 
caused by the difference in bank types, i.e. either single-BHC or multi-BHC structure, however, 
due to the endogenous decision made by CEO to become such bank type or due to omitted 
bank characteristics. 
 
To control for endogeneity, our test focuses on banks switching their parents from 
single-BHC affiliates to multi-BHC affiliates. We make an assumption that banks that change 
their status may not change their characteristics during such a short period, but their efficiency 
changes after switching their status. Difference-in-differences approach eliminates the 
unobserved heterogeneity and increases the evaluation quality (Blundell and Costa Dias 2000). 
This section, thus, tests whether banks switching from single-BHC affiliates to multi-BHC 
affiliates exhibit higher efficiency levels by applying a difference-in-difference regression 
based on propensity score matching method.  
 
We conduct the test in two steps. First, we divide our sample into two sub-samples, 
namely, banks that change their status from single-BHC affiliates to multi-BHC affiliates 
(treated group) and those that do not change their status (control group). We use propensity 
score matching with nearest neighbour matching to match banks that do not change their status 
with those that change their status based on bank-specific characteristics such as bank size, 
capital ratio, non-performing loan ratio and profit ratio. We match the groups in the same year 
to rule out the difference between macroeconomics conditions across different years. 
 
We then estimate differences in bank efficiency between treated banks and non-treated 
banks by the running a following difference-in-difference regression. 
 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 +∑𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(10) 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 is equals to 1 for banks that change the status; and 0 for banks that do not change the 
status. This variable is time-invariant.  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the time after 
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banks change their status and 0 for other periods. The most important variable is the interaction 
between  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖, indicating changes in difference between treated and non-treated 
bank before and after status changes. We include year fixed effect in the equation. 
 
“Insert Table 3 about here” 
 
Table 3 reports the difference-in-difference regression results for two windows: (i) [–
1, +1] that includes one year before and one year after the banks change their status; and (ii) [–
2, +2] that captures the effects of two year before and two year after the banks change their 
status. In all regressions shown in Table 3, the interaction term between  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 is 
positively and statistically significant at the 1% threshold level, implying that single-BHC 
affiliates tend to increase their efficiency after switching to multi-BHC affiliates compared to 
single-BHC affiliates that keep the same status.4  
 
We follow Leung et al. (2019) to apply a dynamic treatment method with this sample 
to see how the difference between treated banks and non-treated banks changes over different 
periods based on the following equation: 
 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡
= 𝜆0 + 𝜆1 ∗  𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
−2 𝑜𝑟−1 + 𝜆2 ∗  𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡










−2 𝑜𝑟−1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for each of the two years before 
banks switch from single-BHC affiliate to multi-BHC affiliate. 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡
0  is a dummy variable 
that is equal to 1 for the year when banks switch their status. 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡
+1 (𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡
+2) is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one year (two years) after changing their status, respectively. We 
include year fixed effect in the equation. 
 
 
“Insert Table 4 about here” 
 
                                                          
4 In an unreported falsification test, the interaction effect (Treat*Post) is no more statistically significant at 
conventional levels when we randomly assign treated and non-treated banks, which means that our difference-in-
difference results are unlikely to be driven by concurrent unobserved events other than that changing the status 
from Single-BHC to Multi-BHC.  
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Table 4 reports the results of the dynamic treatment method. The coefficient of 
𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒−2 𝑜𝑟−1 is small and insignificant, suggesting no systematic differences in pre-trend 
between the treated and control banks and the parallel assumption is likely satisfied (Roberts 
and Whited 2013). Compared to the pre-treatment years, we observe an increase in bank 
efficiency when banks change their status from single-BHC affiliates to multi-BHC affiliates. 
The effect is especially stronger for one and two years after banks change their status. This 
quasi-natural experiment reaffirms our main finding that multi-BHC affiliates are more 
efficient than single-BHC affiliates. 
 
5.4. Optimal structure of BHC and bank efficiency 
The previous results suggest that multi-BHC affiliation has higher efficiency than single-BHC 
affiliation. This section tests whether and how the network size of multi-BHC can affect bank 
efficiency. In other words, is there an optimal network size that can maximize bank efficiency? 
More specifically, network size of BHC is measured by a total number of bank subsidiaries 
and non-bank subsidiaries. To assess the existence of this optimal point, we consider a 
quadratic model to test a potential U shaped form of bank network where 𝑀𝐵𝐻𝐶_𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡 









∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(12) 
 
An optimal point is obtained by taking the derivative of the efficiency score with respect to 
MBHC_network and setting it to zero. The impact of MBHC_network on Bank efficiency has 
been depicted in the Table 5. 
 
“Insert Table 5 about here” 
The coefficient of MBHC_network is positive and statistically significant, while the 
coefficient of its square is negative and significant at the 1% level for fixed effect and truncated 
regressions. This finding confirms that there is an inverted U curve relationship and an optimal 
number of subsidiaries for multi-BHC to obtain the highest efficiency. . As it can be seen from 
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Table 5, the optimal number of subsidiaries for multi-BHC is 205. This finding suggests that 
although multi-BHC affiliate is more efficient than single-BHC affiliates, there is an optimal 
number of subsidiaries that multi-BHC should consider to enhance their affiliates’ efficiency. 
 
5.5. CEO power and bank efficiency 
This section assesses the effect of CEO power on bank efficiency. It proxies for CEO power 
using CEO tenure and CEO duality. CEOs are expected to have more power to influence the 
decisions of the bank when they stay longer in the bank or chair the board (Pathan 2009). On 
the one hand, CEOs with more power better monitor the bank. On the other hand, according to 
Fama and Jensen (1983), the presence of powerful CEOs often signal the absence of internal 
control mechanisms that can adversely affect bank efficiency.  
“Insert Table 6 about here” 
 
The results regarding the effect of CEO power on bank efficiency are portrayed in Table 
6 and are consistent with our expectation. They show that CEO power (proxied by CEO duality 
and CEO tenure) has a negative impact on bank efficiency. The results are statistically 
significant at the 1% level and are consistent with Grove et al. (2011) ; De Jonghe et al. (2012), 
and  De Haan and Vlahu (2016). For instance, De Haan and Vlahu (2016) suggest that banks 
that combine CEO and chairman positions underperform their peers in terms of performance 
and cost efficiency as powerful CEOs tend to take higher risks and reduce bank efficiency. The 
interaction between CEO tenure and MBHC affiliate is negative and statistically significant, 
implying that when CEOs stay longer at the helm of a multi-BHC affiliate, bank efficiency is 
significantly reduced. This is because CEOs in multi-BHC affiliates tend to take more risk in 
particular when they manage the bank for a long time. The same results are found with CEO 
duality as a proxy for CEO power.  
This result has important implications for regulators, policymakers and bank managers 
since CEO power is detrimental to bank efficiency. Therefore, regulators and bank managers 
should consider the risk of giving CEOs more power. 
 
 
6. Robustness test 
6.1. Alternative measures of bank efficiency 
                                                          
5 The number of bank subsidiaries varies in our sample from 2 to 64. The natural logarithm of 20 is almost 3.  
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This section applies a conventional DEA technique as an alternative measure for bank 
efficiency. Although conventional DEA ignores the bank operational procedure, this technique 
has been applied widely in the banking literature. Conventional DEA is easy to apply and 
especially effective to simultaneously combine inputs and outputs of different natures. We 
choose deposit ratio, interest expense ratio and non-interest expense ratio as inputs while loan 
ratio, interest income ratio and non-interest income ratio as outputs (Harris et al., 2013). We 
use input oriented rather than output oriented since it is difficult for banks to enhance their 
outputs given certain level of inputs 
 
“Insert Table 7 about here” 
Table 7 shows that our results are robust irrespective of the efficiency measure, which 
confirms that multi-BHC affiliates have higher efficiency than single-BHC affiliates. In 
addition, Bank size, Bank capital and Bank profit have a positive and significant impact on 
bank efficiency. Bank profit has a large economic impact on bank efficiency, implying that the 
bank that generates a high level of profit often operates more efficiently than others.  
 
6.2. Impact of organizational complexity on bank efficiency  
There is a possibility that organizational complexity might affect bank efficiency. According 
to Stein (2002), organizations with centralized structure are more complex and have tendency 
to rely on hard information, while organizations with decentralized structure are less complex 
and tend to rely more on soft information. In addition, there is an incentive for small 
organizations to produce soft information due to the centralization in decision making of the 
authority.  Meanwhile, large organizations could acquire hard information due to broader scope 
for resource allocation. Berger et al. (2005) find that large banks mainly lend to larger firms 
with good account records while small banks tend to lend to more difficult credits. Therefore, 
complexity of bank structure would have an effect on bank efficiency. 
  
We follow Assaf et al. (2019) to capture organizational complexity with ratio of total 
active subsidiaries over bank total asset times one thousand. Bank holding companies with 
more affiliations per value of assets could have more complex structures. 
 




Table 8 shows that complexity of bank organization has a positive and significant 
impact on bank efficiency at a threshold level of 1%. Banks with more complex structure tend 
to achieve better efficiency due to internal capital market regarded as “source of strength”. For 
example, the affiliations of multi-bank holding companies could receive capital injection in 
case of funding shortfall. In addition, those banks can access federal funds and large CD 
markets easier (Ashcraft 2006) and lend mainly to large firms with higher amount of loans 
(Berger et al. 2005). Therefore, bank efficiency could be enhanced due to lower cost of capital 
and higher amount of loans produced. 
 
6.3. Additional test 
We next conduct a number of cross-sectional tests. These additional tests allow us to 
identify factors that strengthen or weaken the effect of BHC structure on bank efficiency. By 
adopting this approach we can assess the relevance of alternative explanations of the 
relationship between BHC affiliation and bank efficiency such as bank capital, bank soundness 
(bank profitability), asset quality and bank size. As it can be seen from Table 9, the results are 
robust regardless of bank size, asset quality, bank performance, and bank age, implying that 
multi-BHC affiliations have higher efficiency than SBHC affiliations irrespective of the bank 
characteristics. The results also do not depend on whether the analysis is conducted before or 
after the global financial crisis of 2007–2008.  
 
“Insert Table 9 about here” 
7. Conclusion 
This paper examines and compares bank efficiency between single-BHC affiliates and multi-
BHC affiliates. It measures bank efficiency by applying a fuzzy multi-objective two-stage data 
envelopment analysis technique. Using a sample of US commercial banks data from 1994 to 
2018, it shows that multi-BHC affiliates have higher efficiency than single-BHC affiliate. By 
applying difference-in-differences estimation technique based on propensity score matching 
approach, the empirical results suggest that banks enhance their efficiency when they change 
their status from single- to multi-BHC affiliate, which reinforces our conclusions. We use 
internal capital market theory to explain why multi-BHC affiliates have higher efficiency than 
single-BHC affiliates. When banks switch from single-BHC to multi-BHC, they can access to 
more funds in internal capital markets, expanding their operation, and attracting more deposits 





One limitation of this study is the fact that the decision maker preferences over the 
potential adjustments of various inputs and outputs are not considered (Golany 1988). To the 
extent that the DMUs are efficient or inefficient, the assessment relies on the uncertainty over 
the choice of inputs and outputs (Stolp 1990). Therefore, Peykani et al. (2019) suggest 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Single-BHC affiliates 






First quartile Median Third quartile Maximu
m 
 
Bank inputs  
 Bank interest expense 63737 1.18 1.85 0.12 0.70 1.78 2.90 4.25  
 Bank non-interest expense 63737 0.91 3.01 1.27 2.43 2.89 3.42 7.02  
Intermediate product          
 Bank deposit 63737 6.09 84.47 58.68 81.63 85.88 88.9 92.78  
Bank outputs          
 Bank interest income 63737 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.09  
 Bank non-interest income 63737 0.60 0.76 0.09 0.41 0.63 0.93 4.61  
 Bank lending 63737 14.34 62.5 22.72 53.48 63.99 73.15 89.68  
Bank efficiency          
 Bank efficiency 63737 0.17 0.43 0.11 0.31 0.43 0.52 1  
Conventional efficiency 63737 0.08 0.75 0.63 0.69 0.73 0.79 1  
Control variables          
 Bank size 64325 1.22 11.84 9.42 10.98 11.73 12.57 16.10  
 Bank capital 64101 2.70 10.24 5.57 8.43 9.72 11.4 21.96  
 Bank Non-performing loan 48869 1.56 1.22 0 0.24 0.69 1.54 8.82  
 Bank profit 64325 0.76 0.93 –2.64 0.66 0.99 1.31 2.81  
CEO power          
 CEO duality 6366 0.43 0.24 0 0 0 0 1  
 CEO tenure 6347 0.96 1.65 0 1.10 1.79 2.40 3.95  
Organizational structure          
 Ln(total subsidiaries) 64427 0.31 0.08 0 0 0 0 10  
Organizational complexity 64325 0.02 0.01 0.001 0.001 0.01 0.02 0.15  
Panel B: Multi- BHC affiliates 






First quartile Median Third quartile Maxim
um 
Bank inputs         
 Bank interest expense 17439 1.18 2.06 0.12 1.00 2.07 3.09 4.25 
 Bank non-interest expense 17439 0.95 2.88 1.27 2.29 2.74 3.27 7.02 
Intermediate product         
 Bank deposit 17439 7.75 82.88 58.68 79.66 84.9 88.54 92.78 
Bank outputs         
 Bank interest income 17439 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 
 Bank non-interest income 17439 0.77 0.89 0.09 0.46 0.69 1.04 4.61 
 Bank lending 17439 14.5 63.33 22.72 54.55 65.24 73.77 89.68 
Bank efficiency         
 Bank efficiency 17439 0.17 0.50 0.11 0.39 0.49 0.6 1 
Conventional efficiency 17439 0.10 0.78 0.63 0.71 0.76 0.83 1 
Control variables         
 Bank size 17756 1.49 12.02 9.42 10.99 11.78 12.78 16.1 
 Bank capital 17158 3.26 10.27 5.57 8.11 9.39 11.46 21.96 
 Bank Non-performing loan 14056 1.44 1.07 0 0.19 0.60 1.34 8.82 
 Bank profit 17756 0.76 1.09 –2.64 0.79 1.13 1.47 2.81 
CEO power         
 CEO duality 2030 0.46 0.31 0 0 0 1 1 
 CEO tenure 2020 0.91 1.52 0 0.69 1.61 2.2 3.87 
Organizational structure         
 Ln(total subsidiaries) 17936 0.93 1.49 0.69 0.69 1.10 1.95 8.70 
Organizational complexity 17756 0.05 0.05 0.001 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.15 
Panel C: Whole sample 
   Observati Standard Mean Minim First quartile Median Third quartile Maxim  
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ons deviation um um 
Bank inputs          
 Bank interest expense 81176 1.19 1.90 0.12 0.75 1.85 2.94 4.25  
 Bank non-interest expense 81176 0.92 2.99 1.27 2.40 2.86 3.39 7.02  
Intermediate product          
 Bank deposit 81176 6.51 84.13 58.68 81.23 85.68 88.82 92.78  
Bank outputs          
 Bank interest income 81176 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.09  
 Bank non-interest income 81176 0.65 0.79 0.09 0.42 0.64 0.95 4.61  
 Bank lending 81176 14.38 62.68 22.72 53.68 64.29 73.31 89.68  
Bank efficiency          
 Bank efficiency 81176 0.17 0.44 0.11 0.33 0.44 0.54 1  
Conventional efficiency 81176 0.09 0.76 0.63 0.69 0.74 0.80 1  
Control variables          
 Bank size 82081 1.29 11.88 9.42 10.98 11.74 12.61 16.1  
 Bank capital 81259 2.83 10.24 5.57 8.36 9.66 11.41 21.96  
 Bank Non-performing loan 62925 1.54 1.18 0 0.23 0.67 1.49 8.82  
 Bank profit 82081 0.76 0.96 –2.64 0.68 1.02 1.35 2.81  
CEO power          
 CEO duality 8396 0.44 0.25 0 0 0 1 1  
 CEO tenure 8367 0.95 1.61 0 0.69 1.61 2.3 3.95  
Organizational structure          
 Ln(total subsidiaries) 82363 0.78 0.39 0 0 0 0.69 10  
Organizational complexity 82081 0.03 0.02 0.001 0.001 0.01 0.02 0.15  
 
Note: This table presents the summary statistics of multi-bank holding company’s affiliates, single-bank holding company’s affiliates and 
whole sample. Bank interest expense is total interest expense divided by total asset. Bank non-interest expense is total non-interest expense 
divided by total asset. Bank deposit is total deposit divided by total asset. Bank interest income is total interest income divided by total asset. 
Bank non-interest income is total non-interest income divided by total asset. Bank lending is total loan divided by total asset. Bank efficiency 
is banks technical efficiency measured by fuzzy multi-objective two-stage DEA. Conventional efficiency is bank technical efficiency measured 
by conventional DEA. Bank size is log of total asset. Bank capital is total capital divided by total asset. Bank non-performing loan is loans 
with 90 days past due or more and still accrued divided by total loan. Bank profit is net income divided by total asset. . Bank competitor is log 
of number of competitors within state, Bank HHI is Herfindahl-Hirschman index. CEO duality is a dummy variable equals 1 if CEO is a 







Table 2: Efficiency comparisons between single-bank holding company’s affiliates and multi-
bank holding company’s affiliates. 
Variable Bank efficiency 
       Model 1 
OLS 
   Model 2 
Fixed effect 
   Model 3 
Truncated 
 MBHC affiliate 0.008*** 0.028*** 0.007*** 
   (4.639) (12.432) (10.463) 
 Bank size 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 
   (8.532) (5.551) (23.702) 
 Bank capital 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
   (17.152) (14.195) (41.295) 
 Bank non-performing loan –0.002*** –0.004*** –0.003*** 
   (–5.313) (–9.897) (–13.081) 
 Bank profit 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.026*** 
   (21.715) (19.362) (60.400) 
 Constant 0.379*** 0.355*** 0.383*** 
   (38.663) (19.313) (113.267) 
Bank fixed effect No Yes No 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 62554 62554 62010 
R2  0.766 0.762  
 
Note: This table reports impact of bank structure on bank efficiency at the affiliated level. The dependent variable is Bank efficiency measured 
by a fuzzy multi-objective two-stage data envelopment analysis. MBHC affiliate takes value of 1 if banks belong to multi-bank holding 
company and 0 if banks belong to single-bank holding company. Other control variables include Bank size, Bank capital, Bank non-performing 
loan, Bank profit. The first model uses ordinary least square regression with year dummy. The second model uses fixed effect at both bank 
and year level. The third model uses truncated regression model with efficiency truncated at the value of 1. t-statistics are reported in 






Table 3: Difference in difference based on propensity score matching 
   Variable  Bank efficiency   
 
 
[–1,+1]   [–2,+2] 
 
      Model 
1 
OLS 
   Model 2 
Fixed 
effect 
   Model 3 
Truncated 
 Model 4 
OLS 
   Model 5 
Fixed 
effect 
  Model 6 
Truncated 
Treat 0.042***  0.041***  0.030***  0.031*** 
   (3.484)  (3.181)  (2.973)  (3.158) 
 Post 0.018  0.018  0.007  0.005 
   (1.372)  (1.577)  (0.591)  (0.559) 
Treat*Post 0.070*** 0.082*** 0.058***  0.084*** 0.094*** 0.080*** 
   (4.356) (4.975) (3.711)  (6.001) (8.758) (6.290) 
 Bank size 0.012*** 0.055** 0.013***  0.009*** –0.013 0.009*** 
   (2.898) (2.250) (5.317)  (3.132) (–0.469) (4.155) 
 Bank capital 0.009*** 0.005 0.005***  0.007*** 0.010** 0.004*** 
   (4.582) (0.935) (3.978)  (3.286) (2.131) (3.591) 
 Bank non-performing 
loan 
–0.002 –0.018* 0.001  –0.000 –0.005 0.001 
   (–0.558) (–1.844) (0.429)  (–0.078) (–1.190) (0.362) 
 Bank profit 0.015** –0.023 0.020***  0.024*** 0.017 0.036*** 
   (2.294) (–1.315) (3.946)  (2.797) (1.420) (7.194) 
 Constant 0.281*** –0.115 0.295***  0.297*** 0.595* 0.321*** 
   (4.766) (–0.409) (7.176)  (6.494) (1.716) (9.273) 
Bank fixed effect No Yes No  No Yes No 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
 Number of 
observations 
502 502 491  694 694 676 
R2 0.718 0.491   0.729 0.664  
Note: This table reports the impact of changing from single-BHC affiliates to multi-BHC affiliates using difference-in-differences based on 
propensity score matching. The dependent variable is Bank efficiency measured by a fuzzy multi-objective two-stage data envelopment 
analysis. Treat takes the value of 1 if banks switch from single BHC affiliates to multi-BHC affiliates, otherwise 0. Other control variables 
include Bank size, Bank capital, Bank non-performing loan, Bank profit. The first three models cover 1 year period before and after treatment. 
The last three models cover a two year period before and after treatment. The first and the fourth model use ordinary least square regression 
with year dummy. The second and the fifth model use fixed effect at both bank and year level. The third and the sixth model use a truncated 
regression model with efficiency truncated at the value of 1. Other control variables include bank size, capital ratio, non-performing loan, 
profit ratio. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are robust and clustered at bank level. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 




Table 4: Dynamic treatment  
 
   Variable Bank efficiency 
       Model 1 
OLS 
   Model 2 
Fixed effect 
  Model 3 
Truncated 
 Before–2 or –1 –0.003 –0.006 –0.003 
   (–0.231) (–0.645) (–0.342) 
 Current0 0.037** 0.041*** 0.013 
   (2.477) (2.643) (1.095) 
 After+1 0.044*** 0.025* 0.046*** 
   (3.689) (1.783) (4.100) 
 After+2 0.040*** 0.049*** 0.042*** 
   (4.058) (4.481) (3.569) 
 Control Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effect No Yes No 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
 Number of observations. 768 768 751 
R2 0.665 0.655  
 
Note: This table examines the dynamic treatment effect of BHC affiliates on bank efficiency. The dependent variable is Bank efficiency 
measured by a fuzzy multi-objective two-stage data envelopment analysis.  We regress bank efficiency on four indicators variables known as 
Before–2 or –1, Current0, After+1, After+2to examine how bank efficiency changes when banks switch from Single-BHC affiliates to multi-BHC 
affiliates. Before–2 or –1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for one or two years prior to changing in bank status. Current0 is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if it is the year that banks change their status. After+1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if it is one year after banks change their status. 
After+2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if it is two years after banks change their status. Other control variables include Bank size, Bank capital, 
Bank non-performing loan, Bank profit.. The first model uses ordinary least square regression with year dummy. The second model uses fixed 
effect at both bank and year level. The third model uses truncated regression model with efficiency truncated at the value of 1. t–statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Standard errors are robust and clustered at bank level. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, 




Table 5: The impact of bank holding company network on bank efficiency 
 
 
Variable Bank efficiency 
 
    Model 1 
Fixed effect 
  Model 2 
Truncated 
MBHC-network2 –0.003*** –0.001*** 
   (–10.134) (–3.739) 
MBHC-network 0.017*** 0.006*** 
   (10.371) (9.443) 
 Bank size 0.006*** 0.005*** 
   (4.060) (20.440) 
 Bank capital 0.004*** 0.004*** 
   (13.944) (41.343) 
 Bank non-performing loan –0.004*** –0.003*** 
   (–9.762) (–12.982) 
 Bank profit 0.019*** 0.027*** 
  (19.656) (60.692) 
 Constant 0.386*** 0.390*** 
 (21.487) (113.601) 
Bank fixed effect Yes No 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Number of observations 62554 62010 
 R2 0.765  
 
Note: This table reports the impact of MBHC network on bank efficiency. The main dependent variable is Bank efficiency measured by a 
fuzzy multi-objective two-stage data envelopment analysis. MBHC-network is measured by total of bank subsidiaries and non-bank 
subsidiaries. Other control variables include Bank size, Bank capital, Bank non-performing loan, Bank profit. The first model uses fixed effect 
at both bank and year level. The second model uses truncated regression model with efficiency truncated at the value of 1. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Standard errors are robust and clustered at bank level. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, 




Table 6: The impact of CEO power on bank efficiency 
Variable      Bank efficiency 
 
      Model 1 
Fixed effect 
   Model 2 
Truncated 




   Model 5 
Fixed effect 
  Model 6 
Truncated 
MBHC affiliate 0.052*** 0.014*** 0.059*** 0.016*** 0.067*** 0.022*** 
   (7.999) (5.175) (6.963) (3.571) (7.335) (4.656) 
CEO duality -0.013*** -0.005**   -0.014*** -0.005* 
   (-2.687) (-2.011)   (-2.881) (-1.850) 
MBHC affiliate*CEO duality -0.033*** -0.021***   -0.031*** -0.021*** 
   (-3.302) (-4.064)   (-3.193) (-4.024) 
CEO tenure   -0.004** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.005*** 
     (-2.222) (-3.962) (-2.316) (-3.831) 
MBHC affiliate*CEO tenure   -0.011*** -0.006** -0.010** -0.006** 
     (-2.624) (-2.461) (-2.508) (-2.351) 
Bank size 0.014*** 0.006*** 0.015*** 0.005*** 0.015*** 0.006*** 
   (2.863) (7.116) (3.036) (6.112) (3.121) (6.934) 
Bank capital 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
   (6.553) (16.638) (6.497) (16.328) (6.534) (16.315) 
Bank non-performing 
loan 
-0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 
   (-1.418) (-0.453) (-1.323) (-0.177) (-1.365) (-0.313) 
 Bank profit 0.020*** 0.026*** 0.021*** 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.027*** 
   (6.481) (17.192) (6.656) (18.019) (6.709) (17.902) 
 Constant 0.283*** 0.370*** 0.272*** 0.385*** 0.269*** 0.378*** 
 (4.783) (30.991) (4.505) (31.677) (4.434) (31.092) 
Bank fixed effect Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Number of observations 6159 6077 6141 6059 6141 6059 
 R2 0.712  0.709  0.711  
Note: This table reports the effect of CEO duality and CEO tenure on bank efficiency. The main dependent variable is Bank efficiency measured 
by a fuzzy multi-objective two-stage data envelopment analysis. CEO duality equals to 1 if CEO is also a chairman, otherwise 0. CEO tenure 
is log of CEO tenure plus 1. Other control variables include Bank size, Bank capital, Bank non-performing loan, Bank profit. Model 1 and 
model 2 report the effect of CEO duality on bank efficiency. Model 3 and 4 considers the effect of CEO tenure on bank efficiency. Model 5 
and 6 include all variables. Other control variables include bank size, capital ratio, non-performing loan, profit ratio. t-statistics are reported 





Table 7: The effect of bank structure on bank efficiency measured by conventional DEA 
 
Variable Conventional efficiency 
       Model 1 
OLS 
   Model 2 
Fixed effect 
   Model 3 
Truncated 
 MBHC affiliate 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 
   (9.618) (8.149) (24.259) 
 Bank size 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 
   (27.735) (9.663) (82.676) 
 Bank capital 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
   (26.235) (25.103) (64.084) 
 Bank non-performing loan 0.001*** -0.000 0.001*** 
   (2.982) (-0.077) (8.068) 
 Bank profit 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 
   (16.678) (19.586) (52.314) 
 Constant 0.387*** 0.458*** 0.420*** 
   (44.870) (26.380) (144.521) 
Bank fixed effect No Yes No 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 62,554 62,554 60,674 
R2 0.304 0.299  
Note: This table reports the impact of bank structure on bank efficiency at the affiliated level. The dependent variable is Conventional efficiency 
measured by conventional data envelopment analysis. MBHC affiliate takes value of 1 if banks belong to multi-bank holding company and 0 
if banks belong to single-bank holding company .ther control variables include Bank size, Bank capital, Bank non-performing loan, Bank 
profit. The first model uses ordinary least square regression with year dummy. The second model uses fixed effect at both bank and year level. 
The third model uses truncated regression model with efficiency truncated at the value of 1. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard 




Table 8: The impact of organizational complexity on bank efficiency 
Variable Bank efficiency 
       Model 1 
OLS 
   Model 2 
Fixed effect 
   Model 3 
Truncated 
   Model 1 
OLS 
   Model 2 
Fixed effect 
   Model 3 
Truncated 
 MBHC affiliate 0.008*** 0.028*** 0.007***    
   (4.639) (12.432) (10.463)    
Organizational complexity   0.177*** 0.273*** 0.158*** 
    (6.264) (6.812) (15.094) 
 Bank size 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 
   (8.532) (5.551) (23.702) (9.642) (6.408) (28.605) 
 Bank capital 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
   (17.152) (14.195) (41.295) (17.235) (13.491) (41.220) 
 Bank non-
performing loan 
–0.002*** –0.004*** –0.003*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
   (–5.313) (–9.897) (–13.081) (-5.166) (-9.797) (-12.781) 
 Bank profit 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.019*** 0.027*** 
   (21.715) (19.362) (60.400) (21.968) (20.109) (61.290) 
 Constant 0.379*** 0.355*** 0.383*** 0.347*** 0.331*** 0.354*** 
   (38.663) (19.313) (113.267) (28.221) (16.935) (91.325) 
Bank fixed effect No Yes No No Yes No 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
62554 62554 62010 62554 62554 62010 
R2
  
0.766 0.762  0.767 0.766  
 
Note: This table reports impact of bank structure on bank efficiency at the affiliated level. The dependent variable is Bank efficiency measured 
by a fuzzy multi-objective two-stage data envelopment analysis. MBHC affiliate takes value of 1 if banks belong to multi-bank holding 
company and 0 if banks belong to single-bank holding company. Organizational complexity equals total subsidiaries divided by total asset 
times 1000 Other control variables include Bank size, Bank capital, Bank non-performing loan, Bank profit. The first model uses ordinary 
least square regression with year dummy. The second model uses fixed effect at both bank and year level. The third model uses truncated 
regression model with efficiency truncated at the value of 1. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  Standard errors are robust and clustered 





Table 9: Additional test 




Large bank Small bank 
Fixed effect Truncated  Fixed effect Truncated 
MBHC affiliate 0.033*** 0.002*** 0.027*** 0.011*** 
 (8.786) (2.902) (8.821) (10.063) 
Control variable Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effect Yes No Yes No 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of  observations 34,525 34,369 28,029 27,641 
R2 0.780  0.746  
 




Low asset quality High  asset quality 
Fixed effect Truncated  Fixed effect Truncated 
MBHC affiliate 0.030*** 0.006*** 0.027*** 0.009*** 
 (10.831) (7.016) (7.332) (7.153) 
Control variable Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effect Yes No Yes No 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of  observations 41,410 41,196 21,144 20,814 
R2 0.766  0.759  
 




Low earnings High earnings 
Fixed effect Truncated  Fixed effect Truncated 
MBHC affiliate 0.039*** 0.006*** 0.020*** 0.006*** 
 (11.749) (6.344) (7.123) (6.363) 
Control variable Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effect Yes No Yes No 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of  observations 29,914 29,607 32,640 32,403 
R2 0.753  0.785  





Fixed effect Truncated  Fixed effect Truncated 
MBHC affiliate 0.031*** 0.004*** 0.026*** 0.007*** 
 (7.670) (3.025) (9.509) (9.459) 
Control variable Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effect Yes No Yes No 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of  observations 19,310 19,076 43,244 42,934 











Before crisis After crisis 
Fixed effect Truncated  Fixed effect Truncated 
MBHC affiliate 0.032*** 0.006*** 0.043*** 0.007*** 
 (14.104) (9.156) (4.828) (2.953) 
Control variable Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effect Yes No Yes No 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of  observations 47,241 47,184 11,777 11,295 
R2 0.525  0.848  
Note: This table reports the effect of bank structure on bank efficiency. The dependent variable is Bank efficiency measured by a fuzzy multi-
objective two-stage data envelopment analysis. Other control variables include Bank size, Bank capital, Bank non-performing loan, Bank 
profit.. Panel A reports the effect of bank structure on bank efficiency regarding bank size. Small bank is defined as bank with total assets 
lower than average bank asset each year while large bank has total asset larger than average total asset. In panel B, the sample is divided by 
average asset quality each year. In panel C, the sample is divided by average bank performance each year. In Panel D, the sample is divided 
by average bank age each year. In panel E, the sample is divided by crisis which happens during 2007-2009. In each panel, The first and the 
third columns uses fixed effect model with year fixed effect while the second and the fourth column use truncated regression model. t-statistics 







Appendix A. List of variables 
 
Variable Abbreviation Calculation Source 
I. Inputs  
Interest expense ratio Bank interest expense  Total interest expense/Total 
asset% 
Call report 





II. Intermediate product 
Deposit ratio Bank deposit Total deposit/Total asset% As above 
III. Outputs 
Loan ratio Bank lending Total loan/Total asset% As above 
Interest income ratio Bank interest income Total interest income/ Total 
asset% 
As above 






Efficiency with Fuzzy multi-
objective DEA 
Bank efficiency Fuzzy multi-objective DEA 
with interest expense ratio and 
non-interest expense ratio as 
inputs, deposit ratio as 
intermediation, loan ratio, 
interest income ratio and non-
interest income ratio as 
outputs. 
Authors’ calculation 
Conventional efficiency Conventional 
efficiency 
Conventional DEA with 
interest expense ratio, non-
interest expense ratio and  
deposit ratio as inputs, loan 
ratio, interest income ratio 
and non interest income ratio 
as outputs. 
Authors’calculation 
V. Control variables 
Bank size Bank size Ln(total asset)  Call report 
Non-performing loan Bank non-performing 
loan 
Total non-performing loan 
/Gross loan% 
As above 
Capital ratio Bank capital Total capital/Total asset% As above 
Profitability ratio Bank profit Net income/Total asset% As above 
VI. CEO power 
CEO duality CEO duality 1:CEO is chairman, 
Otherwise 0 
Boardex 
Natural logarithm of (1+CEO 
tenure) 
CEO tenure Ln(1+tenure of CEO) As above 
VII. Organizational structure 
Natural logarithm of total 
susbidiaries 
Ln(total subsidiaries) Ln(total number of 
subsidiaries) 
Call report 
Organizational complexity Organizational 
complexity 
Total active subsidiaries times 
1000 divided by total asset  
Call report 
 
